Does Generosity Generate Generosity? An Experimental Study of Reputation Effects in a Dictator Game by Servatka, M.
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
 
CHRISTCHURCH, NEW ZEALAND 
 
 
 
 
 
Does Generosity Generate Generosity? An Experimental 
Study of Reputation Effects in a Dictator Game 
 
 
by Maroš Servátka 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER 
 
 
No. 03/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics  
College of Business and Economics  
University of Canterbury 
Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 
 New Zealand 
 
 
WORKING PAPER No. 03/2007  
 
 
 
Does Generosity Generate Generosity? An Experimental 
Study of Reputation Effects in a Dictator Game 
 
 
by Maroš Servátka† 1 
 
November 2004, last revised October 2007 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT.  This paper explores how information about paired subject's 
previous action affects one's own behavior in a dictator game. The first experiment 
puts dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired 
player or take money away from them: one where the recipient is a stranger and the 
other where the dictator has information on the recipient's reputation. Contrary to 
anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictator's behavior toward a 
stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior toward an 
individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high 
proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. In 
the second experiment the dictators' choices were restricted to only generous 
actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to 
recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a 
reputation. 
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1 Introduction
There are numerous situations in social and economic life where reputation
can play an important role. People might often wish to condition their ac-
tions on information they have about the other party. The reputation does
not have to be observed directly, but could be conveyed by a third party as in
many feedback mechanisms (e.g., eBay and other internet market places) or
referral systems (e.g., doctors referral system, job referral, references in the
school application process). As a part of the social capital, the reputation
might have signicant payo¤s - it can a¤ect trust and trustworthiness and
thus have non-negligible implications for outcomes in bilateral and multilat-
eral interactions. Moreover, the reputation of a person might cause people
to behave towards him or her in a similar manner as he or she behaved to
others.
This paper studies the inuence of reputation on subjects behavior in a
dictator game. In particular, I am interested in answering a question whether
information about generosity (or selshness) of an individual has an impact
on the level of generosity of others towards this person. The rst experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the
paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired
player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has informa-
tion on the paired players reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the
statistical tests show that the dictatorsbehavior towards a stranger is not
statistically signicantly di¤erent from their behavior towards an individual
with an established reputation. The ndings arise because a high proportion
of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. In
the second experiment the dictatorschoices were restricted to only generous
actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to
recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without
a reputation. The dictator game was chosen as a vehicle for investigating
the e¤ects of reputation in their possibly simplest form without strategic
considerations. In addition, the subjectsdecisions in the experiments were
stripped down from any type of framing.
Interpretations of the data in this paper are be based on dening rep-
utation as the decision made by a dictator at one moment of the game.
The reputation is not referred to as what people in general think or say
about someone nor as strategically taken (series of) action(s) as in many
non-cooperative game theoretic models. The focus of the current paper is on
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the e¤ects of reputation in the light of social preferences, more specically
on generating indirectly reciprocal behavior. The main advantage of using a
specic action as a proxy for reputation is that it is easy to generate in the
laboratory. Moreover, it also controls for what particular information the
subjects respond to. From the methodological point of view this experiment
is a conservative test for the e¤ects of reputation because the information
provided to the subjects is minimal. If evidence for its e¤ects is found under
such conditions, one can expect that the e¤ects will be amplied if more
information is provided.
The e¤ects of reputation have already been reported from several exper-
imental settings. For example, Dale et al. (1999) and Schmidt et al. (1999)
nd that the reputation enhances coordination. In Weimann (1994), Cro-
son (1995) and many other public goods experiments, the contribution levels
change after players learn about the contributions by all participants. The
most closely related study in terms of the design is by Fehr and Fischbacher
(2004) who also employ a dictator game to examine whether third party
would punish a dictator for violating a distribution norm. In their experi-
ment the dictator decides on an allocation of 0, 10 , 20, 30, 40, or 50 points
out of the 100 points (= 30 CHF) endowment between herself and an anony-
mous and randomly paired recipient. For each pair, consisting of a dictator
and a recipient, there is a bystander endowed with 50 points who observes
the dictators transfer to the recipient and can punish him after the alloca-
tion is made. Every point spent by the bystander on punishment reduces the
dictators payo¤ by 3 points. Fehr and Fischbacher nd that roughly 60%
of bystanders punish the dictators for violation of the norm and that the
punishment increases with the severity of the violation. Because the focus
of their paper is on costly punishment by a third party, it does not o¤er a
prediction how much would the bystander allocate if he were to become a
dictator himself with the previous dictator taking a place of the recipient.
Falk and Fischbachers experiment does not also permit a conclusion as to
whether the dictator would be rewarded by a bystander for being generous;
an issue explored by the current experimental design.1
1There are three other distinguishing features between Fehr and Fischbachers third
party punishment and the experiments presented in this paper: First, I do not use a
punishment stage where the punishment is costly to the punisher. Subjects play another
round of a dictator game instead. Second, Falk and Fischbacher make the whole structure
of the game a common knowledge, i.e., all involved players know that there is a punishment
stage, where as in this study the nature of future tasks remains unknown. Lastly, my
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Berg et al. (1995) investigate the e¤ects of social history in an invest-
ment game. The social history is used to provide common information about
the use of trust within a group of undergraduate subjects and is understood
as a trust-encouraging factor to achieve a Pareto improvement when reci-
procity is available. This approach can also be interpreted as examining the
group reputation e¤ect on the decision maker; however, Berg et al. focus on
internalization of social norms and not on indirect reciprocity.
In another paper, Grossman and Eckel (1996) nd that history matters in
other circumstances as well. Instead of having an anonymous recipient as in
most of the related dictator games, they inform the subjects that the money
will be contributed to the American Red Cross. This is a signicant treatment
as the amount of money donated by the subjects increases. Grossman and
Eckel explain that the American Red Cross has a long history of providing
benets and thus invites (directly) reciprocal behavior.
The non-strategic element of reputation in this papers distinguishes it
from the vast theoretical literature on (strategic) reputation building when
one type is pretending to be something he is not in order to maximize his
payo¤s. Moreover, there are only a few experimental studies that touch on
the connections between reputation and fairness. Such games require a his-
tory of moves that has to be known to other players. Van Huyck, Battalio,
and Walters (1995, 2001) studied a trust game between a peasant who must
decide how much to plant and a dictator landowner who can conscate the
outcome or its part by taxation. They nd very little trust in the discre-
tion condition when the dictators make their decisions after the peasants
decisions when compared with a precommitment condition. The inclusion of
reputation building with repeated matching in the game yields results closer
to precommitment condition.
The aspect of being observed by someone, thus implying strategic behav-
ior of subjects, is explored by Seinen and Schram (2001). They experimen-
tally study the helping game of Nowak and Sigmund (1998) and observe that
indirect reciprocity is important because many donors base their actions on
the image score of the recipient and on their own score as well. Engelmann
and Fischbacher (2002) introduce two types of players - with and without the
image score and separate pure indirect reciprocity from incentives for strate-
gic reputation building on the helping rate. They nd that pure indirect
reciprocity is relevant but also that the helping choice seems to be inuenced
dictators are not explicitly told that their choices will be revealed to another subject.
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by strategic considerations. In their setting the strategic players do better
than non-strategic ones and non-reciprocal players do better than reciprocal
players. However, none of these above mentioned studies answers a question
whether people react to reputation in a non-strategic environment.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents
the rst experiment on reputation employing a dictator game with an option
to take. Section 3 describes the second experiment studying the reputation
e¤ects in a dictator game where only generous actions are feasible. The last
section concludes.
2 Experiment 1: Reputation in a Dictator
Game with an Option to Take
The experimental design includes a dictator game identifying the players
type and an identical dictator game with known reputation of the paired
player. The use of a dictator game is important in order to rule out possible
within-game strategic interdependence of the subjects monetary payo¤ on
both ones own action and othersactions as well. This feature is critical
to the design because the subjects can make decisions based on their moral
rules, values, and beliefs without having to consider possible reactions of
the paired player. The comparison of a subjectsbehavior in a treatment
where they play with a stranger, and in the reputation treatment where they
have information on the other player, highlights the reputation e¤ects. The
modication of the dictator game used in the rst experiment was introduced
by Cox et al. (forthcoming) in a triadic experimental design with dictator
controls to identify alternative motivations behind the actions of the players
in the moonlighting game (Abbink et al. 2000).
2.1 Stranger Treatment
In the stranger treatment subjects played the following version of a dicta-
tor game: At the beginning of the experiment, both the dictator and the
recipient were endowed with $10. The dictator could send any whole dol-
lar amount between 1 and 10 to the paired recipient, take any whole dollar
amount between 1 and 5 from him, or do nothing and keep both endowments
unchanged. Any amount sent was tripled by the experimenter; any amount
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taken was not transformed. The recipient had no decision to make, thus the
nal allocation was entirely decided by the dictator.
2.2 Reputation Treatment
In the reputation treatment subjects again played the dictator game de-
scribed above with the only di¤erence that the dictator was acquainted with
the reputation of the currently paired recipient. The reputation was repre-
sented by the action taken by the recipient in the stranger treatment where he
served as dictator himself. It is important to note that this action was taken
towards a third person and not towards the current dictator. The prediction
for self-regarding preferences implies that the dictator takes the maximum
amount of $5 from the recipient, irrespective of whether the dictator knows
the recipients reputation or not and irrespective of what the reputation is.
2.3 Procedures
All sessions described in this paper were conducted in the Economic Science
Laboratory at the University of Arizona under double blind payo¤protocol in
which a subjects decisions are never linked to the subjects identity.2 Twenty
eight undergraduate students served as subjects in the rst experiment. In
each session one person was randomly chosen to be the monitor and the
rest were randomly divided into two groups X and Y.3 Group X subjects
were seated in the front row of the laboratory in cubicles. Group Y subjects
were seated in identical cubicles at the back of the room. The monitor was
in charge of distributing and collecting the envelopes with decision forms.
In the general instructions the subjects were told they would participate in
a multiple task experiment without specifying the nature of each task up
front. They were also informed about the random matching procedures for
each task to create an environment where one-shot games are played in an
ongoing social interaction. To control for wealth and portfolio e¤ects, the
subjects were told that a single task would be selected randomly for payo¤s
at the end of the experiment. Once the experiment started, a new set of
individual instructions were provided for each subject upon completion of
each task.
2For a discussion on double blind payo¤ protocol see Ho¤man et al. (1996).
3The monitors did not make any decisions, therefore are not included in the number of
participating subjects.
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The rst experiment addresses the research question in a within-subjects
design. In the stranger treatment the subjects were screened to obtain the
reputation information which was later provided to their paired dictators in
the reputation treatment.45 Both treatments consisted of two tasks, called
Blue and Green in the stranger treatment and Yellow and Orange in the
reputation treatment. The tasks within the same treatment di¤ered only in
the assignment of roles. In Blue (stranger) and Orange (reputation) tasks,
the subjects from group X made decisions as dictators and subjects from
group Y took the role of recipients. In Green and Yellow tasks the roles
were reversed.6 The allocations made by dictators were revealed to their
respective recipients after the completion of all tasks to avoid informational
contamination. At the end of the actual experiment the subjects were asked
to ll out a questionnaire about demographics, understanding of tasks, and
decision rules.
2.4 Hypotheses and Heuristic Predictions
Based on anecdotal and scientic observations that people tend to be nicer
to nicepeople (Albert et al., 2007) and not as niceto selsh ones, the rep-
utation might inuence subjectsactions in the experiment. Fundamentally,
I am interested in answering the question: Do dictatorschoices under a
zero information structure in the stranger treatment di¤er from the choices
in the reputation treatment?If yes, then it is important to ask: What are
the qualitative implications of such changes? In which direction does the
behavior change depending on the reputation type of the recipient? To an-
swer these questions, I rst examine whether there are any di¤erences in the
amounts sent under the two informational structures. The null hypothesis
is:
Hypothesis 1: The dictator sends the same amount to a stranger as to a
4Other studies use a dictator game as a screen as well. See, for example, Cain [1998]
and Charness [2000].
5The sequence in which the treatments follow poses a question of order e¤ects. The
current design is a compromise between the ability to observe the behavior of the same
individuals in two di¤erent conditions and a possibility of a confounding order e¤ect.
The second experiment presented in this paper drops the within subject design and thus
eliminates this problem. Such a change comes at a cost of not being able to observe the
possible change of behavior directly.
6A similar procedure was used in a sequential dictator game by Cason and Mui (1998).
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recipient with known reputation.
However, testing the null might not give much insight about the reputa-
tion because the e¤ects of being paired with a taker and being paired with a
giver might be confounded in the data. Such test does not detect in what di-
rection the behavior changes after learning the specic reputation of a paired
player. The existing literature provides evidence that a non-trivial fraction
of dictators send positive amounts to recipients, anywhere from 10% to 50%
on average.7 According to Cox (2007), the amounts sent could potentially be
magnied by the presence of an ongoing interaction. However, as Bardsley
(2005), List (2007), and Cox (forthcoming) observe, the behavior of dictators
changes dramatically when their action set includes an option to take money
from the recipient. Thus, I expect the current design to create reputations of
being a giver, if the subject sends a positive amount of money in the stranger
treatment, and of being a taker, if he or she sends a non-positive amount.8
Based on these two categories I form the following testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: The dictator sends more to a giver than to a stranger.
Hypothesis 3: The dictator sends less to a taker than to a stranger.
2.5 SubjectsBehavior in Experiment 1
The choices of subjects who participated in the rst experiment are depicted
in Figure 1. The amounts sent by dictators in the stranger treatment are
represented by the solid black bar for each subject pair. The subjects are
portrayed as they were paired in the reputation treatment. The patterned
bar represents the amounts sent by dictators in the reputation treatment af-
ter having observed choices of their paired recipients, i.e., the adjacent solid
black bar. The mean of amounts sent or taken by dictators in the stranger
treatment was equal to -3.88 dollars and in the reputation treatment equal
7See Camerer (2003) for a survey.
8The classication of subjects who send zero as takers is arbitrary, because such action
could be perceived as nice if the reference point is not taking money from the paired
player or not nicewhen the reference point is creating social surplus and giving money.
I perform the statistical analysis both ways and do not nd qualitatively di¤erent results
for the e¤ects of reputation.
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to -3.50 dollars (see Table 1 for a summary of all relevant samples and sub-
samples). The Means and Wilcoxon tests for paired data, presented in the
seventh row of Table 1, report that this di¤erence is statistically insignicant
(p=0.63 and 0.89, respectively) and Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. In the
stranger treatment, 19 out of 26 subjects took the maximum of ve dollars
from their paired players, 5 took amounts between two and four dollars, and
2 subjects gave exactly ve dollars each.9 In the reputation treatment, the
2 subjects who were paired with them responded to such conditional rep-
utation information by sending positive amounts of three and ve dollars,
respectively. Because there are only two data points in this category, fur-
ther evidence had to be gathered. An experiment producing reputations for
generosity is described in the next section.
The remaining 24 subjects were classied as takers. In the reputation
treatment, 21 out of 24 subjects (87.5%) who were faced with takers took
the maximum of ve dollars, 1 subject sent zero, 1 sent one dollar and 1
sent ve. On average, the dictators paired with takers took 4.13 dollars from
them. The comparison of means supports the prediction that the dictator
sends more (takes less) to a stranger than to a taker. However, the Means
and Mann-Whitney tests reported in the last row of Table 1 do not detect
a statistically signicant di¤erence between the samples (p=0.37 and 0.14,
respectively) and Hypothesis 3 is rejected.
The conclusion that a reputation of being a taker does not spark a higher
degree of self-regarding behavior towards this person could seem to be in line
with Cox et al. (forthcoming) who nd that the direct negative reciprocity in
a similar setting of a moonlighting game is not signicant.10 Yet, the current
result is most likely driven by the lower bound of the action set that was
imposed by the experimental design and the high number of self-regarding
choices present in the data. The behavior of self-regarding dictators is further
explored in the next subsection.
9Two data points had to be excluded from the statistical analysis, one because of an
error when recording the reputation information on the subjects decision form and the
other one because the subject marked two answers.
10Note, that in the current design the not nicebehavior towards the recipient is not
costly to the dictator in terms of monetary payo¤s. Thus, taking money from the recipient
cannot be interpreted as an indirect negative reciprocity, given the way it is typically
referred to the literature.
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2.6 Do Self-Regarding Players Pay Attention to Rep-
utation?
The data from the rst experiment involve a signicant number of self-
regarding choices. Table 2 summarizes the frequencies of change in choices
between stranger and reputation treatments. Cason and Muis (1998) nd
that subjects with a more self-regarding rst choice are less likely to change
behavior between the treatments. Their nding receives considerable sup-
port in the present data as well. In particular, 17 out of 19 dictators (89.5%)
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who took ve dollars when paired with stranger did not change their deci-
sions after being rematched with another recipient and learning about his or
her reputation. This result is highly statistically signicant (p-value = 0.000
Fishers exact one-tail test). In contrast, all 7 dictators with a choice other
than taking ve dollars in the stranger treatment change their decision when
confronted with the past action of their new recipient.
There are several possible explanations why the dictators, whose rst
choice is self-regarding, do not change their decision after they learn about
the current recipients reputation. First, and perhaps the most obvious one,
is that the choice represents dictatorsself-regarding preferences and for these
subjects the reputation does not matter. Second, the pattern could be caused
by subjectsbeliefs about the rest of the population which they would cor-
rectly estimate to be highly self-regarding. A self-regarding choice then might
be a perceived as a best response because social norms cannot be maintained.
Third, the subjects could be minimizing the cognitive e¤ort by ignoring the
reputation information and sticking to the rst decision. It could also repre-
sent their preference for fairness along the lines "I take now, you take next,"
observed also in other experimental settings (Cox and Walker (1998), Chan
et al. (2003)). While all these (and perhaps some other as well) are feasible
explanations of subjectsbehavior, I do not o¤er a conclusive answer here.
A more appropriate design aimed at the subjectsmotivation and perhaps
other psychological and physiological forces is needed.
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3 Experiment 2: Reputation for Generosity
The purpose of the second experiment was to produce reputations for gen-
erosity, i.e., to produce dictators who are givers when paired with a stranger.
The design of the stranger and reputation treatments in experiment 2 di¤ers
from their experiment 1s analogues in the following respects: Only the dic-
tator was endowed with $10, the recipient had $0. The dictators action set
was truncated to allow for only nonnegative amounts to be sent.11 Given the
new action set, the self-regarding subjects would keep the whole endowment,
i.e., send zero. Also, the show-up fees of $5 were o¤ered for completing the
questionnaire after the experiment to ensure that some subjects would not
walk out with a zero monetary payo¤. The subjects in experiment 1 did not
receive any show up fees, but were guaranteed at least $5 by the experimental
design.
The second experiment was run across-subjects and thus involved only
a single role reversal. In the rst task, called Blue, group X people played
the dictator game with a stranger from group Y. In the second task, called
Yellow, people from group Y acted as dictators towards recipients with a
reputation from group X. Because each group only made one decision, this
design completely eliminated any possible order e¤ects.
In the second experiment I test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The dictator sends more to a generous person than to a
stranger.
Provided that the conjectures about people being nicer to nice people are
correct, one can anticipate a spillover e¤ect in terms of generosity - a kind-
ness will be rewarded by kindness even in conditions of absolute anonymity.
However, the extent to which this will be observable in the data depends on
the proportion of subjects responding to reputation.
3.1 SubjectsBehavior in Experiment 2
Altogether 68 dictators participated in the second experiment, 34 in the
stranger treatment and 34 in the reputation one. Their behavior is depicted
in Figure 2. In the stranger treatment the dictators sent on average 1.71
dollars. Seven out of the 34 (20.6%) participants sent zero. The remaining
11A similar dictator game was used by Cox (2004).
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27 subjects chose to send money to their recipient: seven subjects sent $1,
thirteen sent $2, four sent $3, two sent $4, and one subject sent $5. The
dictators in the reputation treatment responded to the reputation informa-
tion (in parentheses) as follows: ($0) two dictators also sent zero to selsh
recipients, three sent $2, one sent $4, and one sent $5; ($1) two sent zero,
one sent $1, three sent $3, and one sent $4; ($2) one sent zero, one sent $2,
ve sent $3, three sent $5, and one sent $6; ($3) one sent $2, one sent $3,
one sent $4, and one sent $10; ($4) one sent $1 and one sent $10; ($5) one
sent $3; giving on average 3.03 dollars.
A parametric and a nonparametric statistical tests in Table 3 analyze
the e¤ect of reputation for generosity. Both of them report a statistically
signicant di¤erence between the two treatments (p<0.01). The correlation
coe¢ cient between amounts sent by dictators in the reputation treatment
and the choices of their paired recipients that they observed prior to making
a decision is equal to 0.36. The Spearmans rank correlation test rejects the
null that choices in the stranger and reputation treatments are independent.
Hence, the data from the second experiment provide evidence for the e¤ect
of reputation for generosity on the dictatorsbehavior.
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4 Discussion
This paper reports two laboratory experiments aiming at reputation e¤ects in
an environment exhibiting salient fairness considerations. The experiments
were designed to pick up di¤erences in behavior of dictators towards strangers
and individuals with an established reputation. I nd mixed evidence on the
importance of reputation. In the rst experiment, a majority of dictators
took money from a stranger. In the next treatment the recipients reputa-
tion of being a taker caused the dictators to take even more money, but this
di¤erence was statistically insignicant. On the other hand, the reputation
for generosity caused the dictators in the second experiment to send signif-
icantly larger amounts to generous recipients than to strangers. This result
points to the conclusion that a virtue could be contagious, having an im-
portant implication for economic modeling of interpersonal relations within
social networks. A behavioral model situated in an environment with ongo-
ing social interaction should incorporate the spillover e¤ect of ones action
on the rest of the population. This is particularly relevant when the decision
maker is aware of the possibly long lasting consequence of his action on social
norms.
After making an observation that generosity of rst dictators generated
more generosity by the new ones, it is essential to ask: What motivated the
new dictators to give more than the rst ones? Were they trying to reward
the generous behavior or was their motivation di¤erent? The reputation does
not only inform about the past actions of a subject, but it also carries two
additional features. First, it provides information about the paired recipient,
therefore identifying him. Small and Loewenstein (2003), Yamamori et al.
(forthcoming), and several other studies show that identication itself can
result in a more generous behavior. Second, the reputation can signal beliefs
that the general population holds regarding what type of behavior is socially
appropriate. If the reputation is regarded as socially relevant information, it
can inuence the dictatorsbeliefs about what is considered as appropriate
and change their behavior. The experiment presented in Servátka (2007) sep-
arates these three motivations and concludes that the reputation has stronger
e¤ect than social inuence and identication.
A nal issue concerns the question why the reputation of being a taker
did not play a role in one dictator game but the reputation for generosity
did in another one. Unfortunately, the current design does not o¤er a more
detailed explanation; neither has it suggested how general this nding is.
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More research, both theoretical and experimental, studying what triggers the
relevance of reputation in some scenarios but does not in others, is needed.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Figures
Figure 1. Subjects' Behavior in Stranger and
Reputation Treatments of Experiment 1
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Figure 2. Subjects' Behavior in Stranger and
Reputation Treatments of Experiment 2
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5.2 Instructions
5.2.1 General Instructions
No Talking Allowed
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk or
communicate any longer with each other. Because we will not be available
to assist you, it will not be possible for you to ask questions. In case there is
still something that you do not understand, you are kindly requested to read
the instructions again.
Monitors and Two Groups
A monitor has been selected randomly from among those of you who came
here today. The rest of you have been divided randomly into two groups,
called Group X and Group Y. Group X people are seated in the front row
A. Group Y people are asked to sit at the back of the room (row D).
Multiple Tasks
You will be asked to participate in multiple tasks during the experiment.
The instructions for each task will be given to you after nishing the previous
one. The end of the experiment will be announced to you after completing
certain number of tasks.
Anonymity
Each person in Group X will be randomly matched with a person in
Group Y. No one will learn the identity of the person he/she is matched
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with. In each task a person in Group X will be matched to a di¤erent person
in Group Y. There is no chance of being matched with the same person more
than once during the entire experiment.
Initial Account Balances
Each person in each group will be credited with 10 experimental dollars
at the beginning of each experimental task.
Money Payo¤s
The information about nal account balances in each task will be recorded
by the experimenters. At the end of the experiment a die will be rolled in
front of you to decide the task for which you will be paid in cash. The
remaining balance in your dollar account from the randomly selected task
will be paid to you in cash at the rate of 1 U.S. dollar per 1 experimental
dollar.
Complete Privacy
This experiment is structured so that no one, neither the experimenters
nor the other subjects nor anyone else will ever know the personal decision of
anyone in the experiment. This is accomplished by the following procedure.
You will collect your money payo¤ contained in a sealed envelope, from a
mailbox that only you can open (with your key). Your privacy is guaranteed
because neither your name nor your student ID number will appear on any
form that records your decisions in this experiment. The only identifying
mark in all records will be your seat number and the number engraved on
your key which is known only by you. However, although the experimenters
will not know your identity, they have a way to map your decisions into your
own payo¤ correctly. At the end of the experiment, you will walk one by one
to the waiting room where the mailboxes are to collect your money payo¤
envelope. The key and mailbox are labeled with the same number. But you
will be the only person in possession of that key and the only one who knows
your key number. When collecting the envelope from your mailbox, you are
kindly requested not to open it immediately. You should wait until you leave
the building. After collecting the envelope, you must return your key by
throwing it in a key-return box next to the waiting room door.
Your Private Label
At the end of the experiment you will be given a key in a sealed envelope.
There will be a 5-digit number engraved on your key. The entered number
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will be used to select the box that your key can open, which will contain a
sealed envelope with your earnings inside.
The Role of the Monitor
A monitor was randomly chosen from among the students who volun-
teered for todays experiment. The monitor will be in charge of distributing
and collecting the envelopes with decision form sheets inside little boxes that
contain the envelopes containing mailbox keys. The monitor will also be
asked to watch and make sure that the experimenters actually follow the
procedures that have been explained here.
Decision Forms
Prior to each task you will be given a decision form on a colored paper.
After completing the task, please put the decision form in the enclosed en-
velope, seal it and give it to the monitor. If you did not get a decision form,
you are not making a decision in that task. In such case, please return the
empty envelope.
Please, read the instructions for each task very carefully.
5.2.2 Blue Task Instructions Experiment 1
Decisions
Each Group X person has a single decision to make. He/she can decide
to change or not the dollar account balances of both people. The Group Y
person has no decision to make. Hence, after the Group X person makes
his/her decision, the task ends and the account balance of both persons for
this task can not be changed any more.
Initial Account Balances
Each person in each group will be credited with $10 at the beginning of
this task. The $10 credit will be in your dollar account.
What Happens if a Group X Person Decides to Decrease the Others
Account Balance?
If Person X decides to decrease the Y Persons account balance by $1
then the X persons account balance increases by $1. The Group X person
cannot decrease the Y persons account balance by more than $5.
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What Happens if a Group X Person Decides to Increase the Others Ac-
count Balance?
If Person X decides to increase the Y Persons account balance by $3 then
the X persons account balance decreases by $1. The Group X person cannot
increase the other persons account balance by more than $30.
Review of the Decision Task of a Person from Group X
Each person in Group X will choose a column from the TABLE X. Each
column summarizes how much both matched X and Y persons get or lose,
and their resulting account balances.
Review of the Group Y Decision Task
Group Y Persons have no decision to make. This means that their nal
account balance is determined by the Group X Persons.
Examples
Initial account balances for both X and Y group people are 10 dollars.
If Person X decides to change his/her account balance by +4, say, person
Ys account changes by -4. The payo¤s for this task will yield 14 dollars for
Person X and 6 dollars for Person Y.
If Person X decides to change his/her account balance by 0, person Ys
account does not change. The payo¤s for this task will yield 10 dollars for
Person X and 10 dollars for Person Y.
If Person X decides to change his/her account balance by -6, person Ys
account changes by +18. The payo¤s for this task will yield 4 dollars for
Person X and 28 dollars for Person Y.
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5.2.3 Blue Task Decision Form for a Person from Group X
Your and your paired Group Ys person initial account balance for this task
is $10 each.
Please choose a column from the following table. Indicate your choice by
drawing an arrow that points at the bottom of the column you have chosen
5.2.4 Orange Task Instructions - Experiment 1
Decisions
You are matched with a di¤erent person than in the previous tasks. Each
Group X person has a single decision to make. He/she can decide to change
or not the dollar account balances of both people. The Group Y person
has no decision to make. Hence, after the Group X person makes his/her
decision, the task ends and the account balance of both persons for this task
can not be changed any more.
Initial Account Balances
Each person in each group will be credited with $10 at the beginning of
this task. The $10 credit will be in your dollar account.
What Happens if a Group X Person Decides to Decrease the Others
Account Balance?
If Person X decides to decrease the Y Persons account balance by $1
then the X persons account balance increases by $1. The Group X person
cannot decrease the Y persons account balance by more than $5.
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What Happens if a Group X Person Decides to Increase the Others Ac-
count Balance?
If Person X decides to increase the Y Persons account balance by $3 then
the X persons account balance decreases by $1. The Group X person cannot
increase the other persons account balance by more than $30.
Review of the Decision Task of a Person from Group X
Each person in Group X will choose a column from the TABLE X. Each
column summarizes how much both matched X and Y persons get or lose,
and their resulting account balances.
Review of the Group Y Decision Task
Group Y Persons have no decision to make. This means that their nal
account balance is determined by the Group X Persons.
5.2.5 Orange Task Decision Form for a Person from Group X
You are matched with a di¤erent person than in the previous tasks. The
Group Y person you are paired with for this task has previously made the
following decision as the rst mover:
He/she changed his/her own account balance by . . . . . . . . . .. , therefore,
changing the account balance of paired person by . . . . . . . . . .
Your and your paired Group Ys person initial account balance for this
task is $10 each.
Please choose a column from the following table. Indicate your choice by
drawing an arrow that points at the bottom of the column you have chosen
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5.2.6 Blue Task Instructions - Experiment 2
Initial Account Balances
Each person in Group Y is credited with 0 (zero) experimental dollars.
Each person in Group X is credited with 10 (ten) experimental dollars. As
explained below, each Group X person will have a decision to make about
what to do with his/her Blue Task endowment.
Decisions
Each Group X person has a single decision to make. He/she can decide
to change or not the dollar account balances of both people. The Group Y
person has no decision to make. Hence, after the Group X person makes
his/her decision, the task ends and the account balance of both persons for
this task cannot be changed any more.
The Group X Decision Task
Every dollar given by a person in Group X to a person in Group Y will be
tripled by the experimenters. If Person X decides to increase the Y Persons
account balance by $3 then the X persons account balance decreases by $1.
The Group X person cannot increase the other persons account balance by
more than $30. The following table shows how this works.
Group Y Has No Decision to Make
The Group Y people do not have any decision to make in Blue Task.
This means that they will keep all of the tripled amount sent to them by
individuals in Group X.
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Examples
 If Person X decides to change his/her account balance by -6, person
Ys account changes by +18. The payo¤s for this task will yield 4 dollars for
Person X and 18 dollars for Person Y.
 If Person X decides to change his/her account balance by 0, person
Ys account does not change. The payo¤s for this task will yield 10 dollars
for Person X and 0 dollars for Person Y.
5.2.7 Blue Task Decision Form for a Person from Group X
My initial account balance is $10. The paired person from group Y initial
account balance is $0. Each dollar I give to the paired person is multiplied
by 3 by the experimenter.
My decision is to give the following amount to the paired person. (Please
circle one.)
$0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10
5.2.8 Yellow Task Instructions
Initial Account Balances
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Each person in Group X is credited with 0 (zero) experimental dollars.
Each person in Group Y is credited with 10 (ten) experimental dollars. As
explained below, each Group Y person will have a decision to make about
what to do with her/his Yellow Task endowment.
Decisions
Each Group Y person has a single decision to make. He/she can decide
to change or not the dollar account balances of both people. The Group X
person has no decision to make. Hence, after the Group Y person makes
his/her decision, the task ends and the account balance of both persons for
this task cannot be changed any more.
The Group Y Decision Task
Every dollar given by a person in Group Y to a person in Group X will be
tripled by the experimenters. If Person Y decides to increase the X Persons
account balance by $3 then the Y persons account balance decreases by $1.
The Group Y person cannot increase the other persons account balance by
more than $30. The following table shows how this works.
Group X Has No Decision to Make
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The Group X people do not have any decision to make in Yellow Task.
This means that they will keep all of the tripled amount sent to them by
individuals in Group Y.
Examples
 If Person Y decides to change his/her account balance by 0, person
Xs account does not change. The payo¤s for this task will yield 10 dollars
for Person Y and 0 dollars for Person X.
 If Person Y decides to change his/her account balance by -6, person
Xs account changes by +18. The payo¤s for this task will yield 4 dollars for
Person Y and 18 dollars for Person X.
5.2.9 Yellow Task Decision Form for a Person from Group Y
Information
You are matched with a di¤erent person than in the previous task. The
Group X person you are paired with for this task has previously made the
following decision:
He/she changed his/her own account balance by . . . . . . . . . .. , therefore,
changing the account balance of the paired person by . . . . . . . . . ..
Decision
My initial account balance is $10. The paired person from group X initial
account balance is $0. Each dollar I give to the paired person is multiplied
by 3 by the experimenter.
My decision is to give the following amount to the paired person. (Please
circle one.)
$0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10
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